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INTRODUCTION

Descriptions of split-brain patients raise the question whether they each have one mind or two.

Thomas Nagel,

in “Brain-Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness,"

argues

as though the determining factor in assessing this question

were whether the patients were in ordinary or in experimental
situations.

But the difference between the one-mind view,

and the two-minds view does not depend on the experimental

situation per se; it depends upon whether or not the behavioral strategies used by patients in the experimental situation are permitted, and upon the explanation offered of these

strategies.

Because the difference between these views de-

pends upon the explanation of strategies, the crux of the

dispute is the relation held to obtain between
and the contents of his mind.

a

subject

If this relation is held to

be one of direct access or introspection, then split-brain

patients each have two minds.

If strategies are described

as passing information and afforded the status of mental

events,

then split-brain patients have one mind each.

Given an account of the mechanisms involved in strategies, and an account of the mind which embodies those mechanisms,

the one-mind view is more plausible.

An account of

the mind relying on the possibility of parallel processes

which can permit intelligent actions to proceed without

2

reflective attention and without permitting introspection,
offers a more plausible alternative than that of the two-

minds view.

The two-minds view cannot account for the use

of strategies as well as the parallel-process view of con-

sciousness.
rect,

Moreover, if the parallel process view is cor-

the two-minds view must incorporate its major features

anyway.

As the two-minds view has serious conceptual diffi-

culties of its own, and constitutes an addition, rather than
an alternative to the parallel process view,

it is unacceptable.

3

PHYSIOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Research on patients with bisected brains, in which
the commissures connecting the hemispheres were severed or

are congenitally missing,

is philosophically interesting

because it raises

a

of consciousness,

and the relation of mind to body.

questions arise in

number of issues concerning the nature

a

These

distinctly physiological context.

The

philosophical issues obviously cannot be resolved by appealing to the facts in the case-histories of split-brain patients.

The conceptual gap between the physical condition or observable behavior of the patient, and the attribution of con-

sciousness, or the description of the mind prevent this sort
of solution.

Philosophical grounds for ascribing conscious-

ness and philosophical descriptions of the mind are required.

The obvious question is why one would want to give

a

philosophical account so closely tied to neurological research.

Descriptions of split-brain patients show that they appear
to have multiple consciousness,

tions*

they

lack,

at least under certain condi-

behavioral features formerly assumed to be

typical of persons possessing single, unified minds.

It be-

comes crucially important to understand what these descriptions presume as conditions of consciousness and how it is

experimentally demonstrated that these conditions are met.
Researchers must establish that the right and left hemispheres
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of the patient's brain demonstrate that they satisfy these

sufficient conditions, as well as that they independently
satisfy these conditions.
are difficult to establish.

Unsurprisingly, these contentions
In the first place,

it is diffi-

cult to establish whether certain functions of the cerebral

hemispheres are performed independently of the lower brain
and spinal cord.

Unless this fact can be established, there

is no reason to claim that the hemispheres are independently

capable of consciousness.

Secondly, most interesting candi-

dates for sufficient conditions for consciousness are themselves capacities; the data on the functions of the hemispheres
relies on the fact that under certain conditions, the patient
is incapable of exercising those functions.

Strong claims

by
are made concerning the patient's capacities as evinced

failure to respond.

These claims must be examined.

Descriptions of the sorts of behavior exemplified by
split-brain patients manifesting disconnection syndromes,
examined.
or loss of certain functions, must be

General

function
accounts of disconnection syndromes center on the
of the great cerebral commissures,

those fiber bundles con-

the corpus
necting the hemispheres of the brain, notably

callosum.

Myers discovered that

a

cat with

a

sectioned

learned by manipulatcorpus callosum could not perform tasks
were forced to try to use
ing one front paw, if the animal
This result followed only if sectioning
the other front paw.
which were sectioned
had occurred prior to learning; cats

after learning could switch paws and perform the tasks easily.

Myers and Sperry then performed other tests

,

attempting to

establish that the function of the corpus callosum was to
permit the transfer of information from one hemisphere to
the other.

While the hemispheres of the cat's brain seem to duplicate each other, so that sectioning after learning leaves

both sides capable of performing the learned tasks, this result does not follow in primates.

In monkeys, some tasks

learned before sectioning will be performed indiscriminately
by either left or right limbs; other tasks appear to be

limited to only one set of limbs.
cats are said to "lay down engrams"

In neurological jargon,
(or memory traces)

in

both hemispheres of the brain, while monkeys sometimes lay
down engrams on one side, and sometimes on both, depending
on the task.

Humans have specialized functions in opposite hemispheres,
though the evidence on whether these differences depend on
the physiological structures of the hemispheres or develop

only through use is inconclusive.

This is an important

point in contending theories of the possibility of multiple
consciousness; critics of the two-minds view argue for innate

differences in capabilities, while proponents of the twominds view argue for the development of different capacities.

Theories on this subject are closely related to studies of
cerebral dominance, handedness, and speech capacity.

In
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humans,

limb control, vision, and audition are controlled

chiefly contralaterally

the left hemisphere of the brain

:

controls the right side of the body, and vice-versa.

The

sense of smell is notably ipsilateral with the right hemi-

sphere of the brain controlling the right side.

Somesthetic

sensation is predominantly contralateral, but crude information is given ipsilaterally

.

Finally, the muscles of the

face and neck can be operated by both the right and left

hemispheres of the brain.

^

The correlation of dominance and

speech gives most people left-hemisphere speech centers.

If

severing the commissures effectively segregates the hemispheres of the brain, then one would expect that the right

hemisphere would be effectively isolated from speech, while
the left side of the body would be unable to perform tasks

dependent upon the specialized capabilities of the right
hemisphere of the brain.
These expectations appear to be fulfilled, at least
during experimental situations where strategies were identified and prevented.

Objects placed out of sight in the pa-

tient's left hand could not be verbally identified by the
patient, and the subjects scored no better than chance if

asked which of several objects they were holding.
the subjects did not kn ow.

Presumably,

But if they were permitted to use

their left hand to point to a picture of the object (selected
idioms expressing apparent independence of the left
and right hemispheres enter early; all that is intended here is
that information and movement is subject to bilateral control.
J-The
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from a group) or a written word identifying the object held,
the subjects were able to do this task correctly.

On the

other hand, spatial relations appear to be a special task
of the right hemisphere of the brain.

Although all of the

patients were right-handed, none of the patients could copy
simple geometric figures with the right hand, although they

could do fairly well with the left.
On the basis of experiments such as these, experimenters

concluded that it was utterly misleading to accept the verbal
testimony as indicative of the knowledge possessed by the
subjects.

They concluded that the left hemisphere of the

brain could not "speak" for the right, and they began to
accord the "sides" of the patient's body independent status
as experimental subjects.

this approach.

There are certain problems

In the first place,

v/ith

in some experimental

situations, patients failed to manifest the expected separation of function, and the patients were capable of performing

certain tasks which were theoretically impossible, given the
experimenters' assumptions.

Some of these tasks were traced

to particular strategies used by the patients,

though for

other tasks the ability to integrate behavior could not be

determined to be based on strategies.

Secondly, two cate-

gories of cases in the split-brain literature failed to ex-

hibit the expected disconnection syndromes.

Subjects lacking

the corpus callosum from birth tended to perform as normal

subjects on the psychological tests devised for split-brain

i
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patients

.

Various explanations are offered for these cases

either the subjects are described as having developed separate capabilities in the different hemispheres, or they are

asserted to be relying upon alternate neurological pathways
for the transfer of information.

Other patients, notably

those whose epilepsy w as not cured by sectioning, also fail
to exhibit disconnection syndromes.

In most cases,

these

patients did not undergo the same psychological testing as
the split-brain patients did; some experimenters thus attrib-

ute their failure to exhibit disconnection syndromes to unde-

tected strategies, which were not prevented.

Others, noting

the similarities between the electrical activity postulated
to account for learning and that involved in epileptic

seizures, noting that the seizures were not prevented, sug-

gested that the patients were using the same sort of pathways
permitting seizures to pass information from one hemisphere
to the other.

At the very least, disconnection syndromes are

not yet fully understood.

After giving accounts of the behavior of split-brain
patients in normal and experimental situations, taken to indicate either single or multiple consciousness,
a

I

will consider

possible account of the behavioral integration displayed in

these situations.

The most interesting explanations attempt

to reveal strategies used to pass information from one hemi-

sphere to the other, where prevention of these strategies
causes

a

loss of integrated behavior of certain kinds.

9

Briefly,

I

contend that consciousness is identified by Nagel

and by others, with acting in a functionally integrated

manner.

What it is, which is functionally integrated, varies

in descriptions of split-brain patients.

Nagel, for example,

refers to the integration of stimuli, as well as to the inte-

gration of overt behavior.

Other accounts of consciousness

describe behavioral routines as displaying functional inte-

gration as overt behavior, and refer to the intentions behind
such integration.

The lack of unanimity, or even consistency,

in descriptions of what is integrated,

grated leads to

a

and how it is inte-

confusion of mental and physical events,

as well as to a confusion of introspection and integration.
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SPLIT-BRAIN PATIENTS' BEHAVIOR
AND STRATEGIES
The most obvious fact concerning split-brain patients'

behavior is their ability to perform simple and even complex
tasks easily, without apparent confusion, or loss of coordi-

nation.

Their ability to perform most tasks after the sever-

ance of the commissures is comparable to their level of

performance prior to the operation; this ability requires an
explanation.

Apparently, either the tasks were ones which

the patients had

"

over learned" and could do almost automati-

cally, or the patient could watch himself performing the
task,

and so coordinate his activities.

Norman Geschwind

writes in Disconnexion Syndromes in Animals and Man

(p.

624):

We were perplexed by this at first, but then realized
that as long as each hemisphere had learned its task
In
such bimanual activities could be carried out.
our case, a command to tie the shoelaces would thus
have been conveyed to the left hemisphere; the right
But the visual
hand would then move to begin the task.
receive
thus
would
hemisphere
right
the
regions of
of the
share
its
do
proceed
to
and
visual stimulation
the
of
analysis
careful
a
more
Presumably,
task.
latencies with which each hand began to do its task,
would have helped prove this mechanism.

Geschwind suggests that it is the ability to watch one side
performing the tasks which leads to coordinated activity.
There were two patients who failed to perform normally
even under normal conditions, at least on occasion.

,
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Geschwind
with

a

2

cites Kurt Goldstein's description of
.

a

patient

sectioned corpus callosum:

have pointed out the presence in my patient of a
feeling of strangeness in relation to movements of
the left hand which she described with such curious
expressions (she would say that someone was moving
her hand and that she wasn't doing it herself) that
(p. 638)
she was regarded at first as a paranoiac.

I

Sperry and Myer

'

s

first patient also tended to experience

what are described as conflicts between the right and the
left hand.

Sperry writes, "The patient and his wife used to

refer to the 'sinister left hand' that sometimes tried to
push the wife away aggressively at the same time that the

hemisphere of the right hand was trying to get her to come
and help him with something.
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This same patient is further

^

described by Gazzaniga (in The Bisected Drain

,

107):

p.

Once he grabbed his wife with his left hand and to
shook her violently, while w ith his right ^trying
belligercome to his wife's aid in bringing the left
playing
was
I
while
ent hand under control. Once,
he
horseshoes with the patient in the backyard
house
the
against
happened to pick up an axe leaning
likely
entirely
was
with his left hand. Because it
might be in
that the aggressive right hemisphere
wanting
scene--not
control, I discreetly left the
he If
which
of
to be the victim for the test-case
brain does society punish or execute.
.

had difficulty
It is possible that these patients

m

coordi-

coordinating their emotions
nating their movements, or in
other types of brain damage.
and their movements because of
2 Norman

Geschwind, "Disconnexion Syndrome;

Man" (in Brain 88,

in Animals and

1965), p. 638.

the Mechanisms of
Sperry, "Brain Bisection and
Brain and Conscious^ E xpe r ience
Consciousness" (in Eccles, ed.
3

R. W.

,

p.

304.

)
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This factor has been offered in explanation of the behavior
of Sperry's patient.

The interesting factor in the explana-

tions of the experience of these patients lies in the coupling of their behavior with their subjective experience of

their behavior as unintegrated; only Goldstein's patient ex-

perienced this disintegration.
In considering the results of the test-situations,

one

finds the use of strategies to be an important factor in pro-

ducing integrated behavior.

When the subject was prevented

from using strategies to pass information "around the split,"

disruption of some functions resulted.

The disrupted func-

tions varied, depending upon the nature of the experiment;

behavior routines which were not being tested concurrently
did not evince disruption.

Gazzaniga

4

describes several

types of strategy, such as target information crossover, eye

divergence, emotional cross-cuing, ipsilateral somatosensory
"leakage," and perhaps most interesting, cooperative strateA few examples of various of these strategies follow.

gies.

Monkeys confounded researchers' expectations with their
ability to retrieve objects using the ipsilateral hand and
preeye (when the use of either opposing hand and eye were

vented).

By examining slow-motion films of the monkeys'

target inforactions, researchers identified the strategy of

mation crossover.
4

Although without the slow-motion film, the

Michael Gazzaniga, The Bisected Brain

,

Chapter

6.
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monkeys appeared to simply reach out and grasp the object,
they were in fact using visual information to orient the
head, neck,

and shoulders toward the object, and then using

this postural information to guide their reach.

Some monkeys

were discovered to have had their eyes shut when they reached
to retrieve the object.

Experiments were then done, in which

the monkeys' heads were restrained; the monkeys proved unable
to retrieve objects under these conditions.

It was anticipated that subjects with sectioned commis-

sures would be unable to make visual-visual comparisons in-

volving the use of both eyes.
to do so.

Most subjects proved unable

But some patients could tell whether a line was

continuous or discontinuous, even when the discontinuity

occurred at the break in their visual fields.

The patients

were using eye divergence to discover the difference.
the facial muscles of one "side"

to control both eyes,

Using
the

patient would place the fixation points of both eyes at the
height of the line perceptible to that side; the subject then

waited to find whether the other "side" would raise or lower
the fixation point.

The change, if there was one, was per-

ceptible; this strategy was repeated, v/ith greater and greater

refinement, until the lack of further response indicated to
the subject whether the lines were continuous or discontinuous.

Cooperative strategies offer
strategies such as eye divergence?

a

refinement of feedback
they oiler more information

s

.
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to the sides.

Trevarthen

reported that one monkey with

a

split-brain was consistently able to make visual-visual comparisons across hemispheres in one experiment; the monkey was
able to identify the larger of two circles in different visual

After extensive testing, Trevarthen 6 conceded the

fields.

possibility that the visual mechanism involved in the disl

crimination was sub-cortical, and thus unaffected by the

Gazzaniga

split.

7

monkey had devised

proposed an alternative explanation.
a

The

strategem, rather like calculating the

odds in playing blackjack against an opponent.

In Trevarthen'

I

experiment, five circles of various sizes were used, and after

several trials, each "side" had become familiar with their

relative sizes.
largest as

1,

(For convenience,

and so on.)

I

will refer to the

Each side was to respond immedi-

ately if it recognized the larger circle, by pressing

a

button on that side.
Because each side knew the relative sizes of the circles
each would respond immediately if it saw

side responded immediately if it saw
ton for the opposite side.

5,

1.

Similarly, each

by pressing the but-

And all the other possibilities
If one

were decided through the use of response latencies.
side had
5 C.

B. Trevarthen,

^Ibid.
7

it waited for the other's response; observing

2,

Ibid.

,

p.

,

pp.

cited by Gazzaniga, ibid.,

102

102-103.

p.

102.
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that the other side did not respond immediately (as it must
to have 1),

the side with

larger circle.
side recognizing

2

would indicate that as the

If 4 was shown in combination with

3,

the

hesitates; if the other side does not

4

press the opposite button indicating it recognizes

5,

the

side with 4 presses the opposite button to indicate that it
has the smaller circle.

To test whether this strategy was

indeed being used, the number of circles to be discriminated
among was increased to ten; the subjects were unable to re-

spond correctly.

This result was consistent with the finding

the subjects could not make visual-visual color comparisons.

All of the strategies employed have common features:
they are all performed in situations in which the subjects
(both sides) understand the task to be performed, and are

able to structure the situation with their bodies by using

They structure the situations using

response latencies.
latencies, in such

a

way that failure to responct is signifi-

cant to the side lacking direct information.

There are seri-

ous limitations on the amount of information that can be

transferred in this way.

First, the situation must be some-

obvious to
how defined so that the required action is either
action, the
both sides, or so that if one side "initiates" an

other can grasp what is required of it.
is done is not obvious;

How this structuring

it is a very fundamental problem, be-

hemispheres
cause much of the vaunted "independence" of the
action by the
rides on explication of the initiation of

16

hemispheres, or the claim that the hemispheres observe each
other.

Secondly, the mode of information transfer must admit

the lack of response to count as significant, constituting
a form of feedback;

is required,

this indicates whether more information

or whether there is sufficient information for

"overt" action using that information.

Finally, the subject

must be free either to react or not to react, if the lack of

response of one side is to constitute an informative response.

Preventing strategies requires the control of these factors;
either the experimental situation is made more complex, and
thus unamenable to structuring, or the subject is restrained
so that the lack of response is no longer informative.

In

essence, the experimental restrictions serve to saturate the

subject's medium of communication, or to block it altogether.

,
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INTEGRATED BEHAVIOR, INTROSPECTION,
AND STRATEGIES

Confusion concerning whether each split-brain patient
has one mind or two is a consequence of the confusion of two

models of consciousness.
tion,

One model relies upon verbal media-

and is necessarily serial; introspection and the concept

of a stream of consciousness are commonly assimilated to this

model.

The second model relies upon parallel processes, and

incorporates verbal mediation as one of these processes;
other activities proceed concurrently.

On this latter inter-

pretation not all of our behavior can be introspected concurrently.

The unity of consciousness on this model does not

require the ability to perceive the relations among experiences.
A crucial feature of this model is thus the way in which

these parallel processes are conceived as unified subjective

experience.

Although the parallel model is given as a de-

scription of the consciousness of normal persons, it can be
adapted to serve as

brain patients.

a

description of the experience of split-

The primary virtue of this adaptation is

that it rids us of the temptation to equip split-brain patients with mental processes which are both parallel and
in trospectible.

On the single string, serial model of consciousness

action is mediated solely by verbal intervention.

The input

18

system sees uhe object end names it*

a

verbal mediator, using

the name of the object, names an appropriate action, which is

then executed by the output system.

There are several obvi-

ous difficulties with this model, as a description of con-

sciousness.

!

irst,

it fails even as a model of perception.

Studies of perceptual difficulties, as well as of language

difficulties, have demonstrated that the inability to name
an object does not preclude the ability to recognize it, or
to demonstrate that recognition through the use of the object.

But the major failing of this model lies in the requirement
for a central executive which controls all the activities of
the system.

This model is manifestly false, as there are

forms of intelligent action, such as complicated sensori-

motor routines, which do not require an arch-controller.

Much

of our ordinary behavior consists of these routines; once

learned, they no longer require conscious attention.

Finally,

some of our actions may depend upon conditional responses

which are attuned to certain "thresholds" on gradients of
sensory input; any attempt to give
processes is doomed to failure.
a

a

verbal account of these

Verbal mediation cannot be

prerequisite of all conscious action.
If verbal mediation is not a prerequisite of all con-

scious action, it is inappropriate to regard verbalizable

knowledge as

a

paradigm of all knowledge.

is not a necessary condition of knowledge,

other account.

If verbalizability

then we need some

This account is given explicitly in the

19

refutation of conscious action as necessarily verbal iz able
it is the ability to use the object.

*

Michael Arbib^ suggests

"We normally ignore the linguistic level and instead explore
the idea that the 'meaning'

of an input for an organism re-

sides in the interactions that are appropriate with the object it represents

,

which actions depend not only on what an

object is, but on where it is."

In short, meaning is use,

and is therefore necessarily context-dependent.
A parallel system incorporates a verbal mediator, which

receives information from the input system and which may send

instructions to
nate" an action.

a

non-verbal sensori-motor center to "desigThe significant difference between the

serial and parallel models is that the sensori-motor center
can operate without the intervention of the verbal system, in

"designating" an action to be performed by the output system.

These actions may be quite complicated, and involve very

sophisticated routines.

The sensori-motor center is certainly

capable of intelligent action, as Arbib describes it.

Briefly,

to be capable of intelligent action is to be capable of per-

ceiving "features of a situation beyond 'raw sensation.'"

the possession of

He gives as features of intelligent action:
a

9

modifiable model of the world, in terms of the potentiality

of interaction with its features;

flexibility and generality

^Michael Arbib, The Metaphorical Brain
-3

Ibid.

,

pp.

93-94.

,

p.

166.
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in these interactions;

the ability to plan.

D. M. MacKay

suggests that intelligent action "makes use of the correlations and regularities observable, to improve the strategy
of control of adaptive action."

10

The possibility that the sensori-motor center may

operate independently of the verbal mediator is very important; it makes the parallel system an anarchic one.

parallel model lacks

a

The

central executive, and some explana-

tion must be given of the organism's ability to act in an

integrated manner.

For example, there is nothing to preclude

the possibility that the verbal mediator may order one action,

while the sensori-motor system is engaging in ordering

wholly incompatible action.

a

Somehow there must be a priority

system which can choose among competing possible courses of
action; this priority system determines which segment has
the more important information, and gives control of the

organism to that segment, though presumably only for the

duration of that action.

Warren McCullough

describes this

command,
as the problem of redundancy of potential

lated a principle for its resolution.

and formu-

Roughly, the principle

organism finds itself
is that the situation in which the
with
designates the action of the organism, in conjunction

Conscious
MacKay "Cerebral Organization and the
and Conscious ExperiControl of Action" (in Eccles ed. Brain
ence
p. 429.
10 D. M.

,

)

,

,

11 McCul lough

,

cited in Arbib, op. cit.

,

pp.

17

10
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the organism's goals.

McCullough offered as illustration

the strategy employed by the United States Navy in World

War II in assigning command in battle; the first ship to

sight the enemy assumed command, whether or not it was the

flagship in which command of the fleet normally resided.
Thus, the redundancy of potential command is resolved because
the situation chooses the "actor."

The interest of the parallel model lies in the possi-

bility of assimilating the account of the consciousness exemplified by split-brain patients to

applicable to normal people.

a

model of consciousness

The ability of split-brain pa-

tients to use strategies to integrate their behavior, in

contexts where both hemispheres share goals and can use contextual information to grasp the significance of the other
side's response, is then merely an instance falling under

McCullough's principle; the hemispheres of the split-brain
patient's brain can be accommodated as parallel processes.

There are major questions which are not answered, however; the
simple expedient of pointing out that split-brain patients

observable behavior approximates that of normal patients,
does not answer whether or not split-brain patients

experi-

ence is markedly different from that of normal subjects.

The

principle
most important question concerns the relation of the

preventing conflict of action, to our subjective experience.
passive
The key point here lies in the fallacy of the

perceiver.

The belief in

a

serial, introspectible

22

consciousness is conditioned by the belief that objects
simply are "out there," and impress themselves upon us by
means of our senses.

We simply see them.

The idea that we

have direct access to our senses simply reinforces this view.

But perception itself is action oriented; we notice things
for a purpose.

12

Things exist as sets of features whose

further discrimination depends upon our assessment of their
use in the light of potential actions.

The ability to re-

solve the redundancy of potential command is thus
of our discrimination of objects;

ceive.

condition

a

it determines what we per-

The ability to resolve parallel processes into non-

conflicting actions makes our subjective experience possible.

We attend to all kinds of sensory events proceeding at once
around us, but because we transform them into objects only
in the context of our own goals and can finally only intro-

spect the results of the organization of those goals (and not
the process), we recognize a series of perceptions.

The unity

of consciousness on this view refers, not to the ability to

experience (in any introspectible sense) the relations of
experience, but to the unity of the organizing system, choosing
of course, we have the additional time and inter
But it is a mistake
est to note things for their own sake.
not all,
to assume that all of our noticing is of this sort;
"aimless ^
or even most, of our perceptions are garnered in this
The ability to perceive sense-data disinterestedly,
fashion.
although they may be "meaningless" themselves, and to remember
of
them later, poses a very difficult problem for any theory
difficulty
The
one.
this
for
perception’ but particularly
giving
with appealing to the "goals of the organism" lies in
to
ability
the
for
account
can
an explanation of memory which
conin
information
useless
store and later locate apparently
texts where it has meaning.

^Unless

_
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from among various possible actions.
tion is

a

The integration condi-

necessary condition of introspectible consciousness,

but integration cannot be introspected.
In order for the integration of sense-data to be intro-

spectibly conscious, the sense-data themselves must be introspectibly conscious and their relations empirically discoverable.
If their relations are empirically discoverable,

then it must

be possible to observe that these relations do not obtain and
to be conscious that they do not.

There is, however,

a logi-

cal impossibility in assuming that one and the same subject

can perceive his perceptions as isolated in his consciousness*
if he perceives them,

they are necessarily his but if they

are not his, he cannot perceive them to lack relationships,

simply because he cannot perceive them.

The observation of

the mind by itself is logically impossible.

Without con-

sciousness, of introspectible consciousness, portions of the
the
brain may reciprocally monitor one another; portions of

mind, however,

are inherently absurd.

the
The fallacy of confusing the two conditions lies in

perceives
attempt to demonstrate that the split-brain patient
way.
objects independently, in this introspectible

when perception is taken to be

a

It is

passive process, enabling

consciously so that we
us to see exactly what we observe
perceptions, that we are
seem to have "direct access" to our
patients have two
tempted to hold the view that split-brain
minds, or two
streams of consciousness, two introspectible
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selves (with attendant self-consciousness).
illusory.

Either we must be content with

a

This view is

perfectly mechani-

cal process which passively registers the presence of objects,
or we assimilate the behavior of the "sides" of split-brain

patients to the parallel processes described.

It is unclear

how one would make the transition from a passive perceiver-

object namer to

a

conscious aqent; if we account for the

inability of the left hemisphere to describe what is happening on the right,

the ability of the right hemisphere to

identify objects independently of the left's is not an argument for its independent self-consciousness.

The claim that

the right hemisphere is self-conscious because it perceives

objects, requires the use of a model of active perception.

But this claim cannot be substantiated, for it requires
its own hierarchy of perception;

it requires that there be a

mechanism for the resolution of redundancy of potential command which is independent of the left hemisphere.

The diffi-

culty with this requirement is that it takes independent

priority systems to set goals, one for the left hemisphere
and one for the right; it is extremely difficult to prove

that this is possible.

The difficulty lies in structuring

independence.
an experiment which could prove this volitional
to this
Only one experiment had been addressed specifically
monkey was allowed to choose with one hand between

issue.13 A

were treated with
red or green grapes, where the green grapes

l^Qazzaniga, op. cit.

,

p.

144.
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quinine; offered a choice with the other hand between un-

treated red and green grapes, the monkey did not hesitate
to eat the green ones.

as he realized,

simply adopt

a

The defect in Gazzaniga's experiment,

lies in demonstrating that the monkey did not

conditional experiment.

Finally, the claim

that hemispheres act independently in other experimental

situations is dubious at best; it rests on the premise that

because the data of the experimental situation were restricted

perceptually to one hemisphere, the purpose of the experiment
to match words with pictures)

(e.g.,

1'

hemisphere .'

4

was restricted to that

Finally, taking such structured evidence as

indicative of purpose is at best misleading; it seems more

plausible to argue that the purpose is that of the experimenter .
My intention here has been to demonstrate that if we

assume the right hemisphere to be an utterly passive perceiver, then there is no temptation to consider it conscious;
a

machine which names objects is only more sophisticated than

a

machine which reads numbers off checks, and there is no

need to consider either of them conscious.

If we abandon a

passive model of perception, and attempt to give an account
of consciousness in terms of the ability to discriminate

features as significant in the light of some purpose, then
it would be difficult to reconright hemisphere follows
the
cile Thomas Nagel's claim that
that there is no
observation
instructions with Gazzaniga's
verbs at all.
understands
evidence that the right hemisphere

^Indeed

if this were so,
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it becomes increasingly harder to justify attributing inde*

pendent consciousness to the hemispheres, because it becomes

increasingly difficult to discern what could cause subjectively important differences in significance.

Any differ-

ences in the experimental subject's perceptions in experiments
are features of the experiments, and not of his consciousness.

The crux of this argument is whether subjects occasionally manifest conflicting modes of behavior, and whether they
are subjectively aware of them.

For this, there is only

Goldstein's "paranoiac" patient, and Sperry's patient whose
left hand occasionally got out of control.

Goldstein's pa-

tient described her hand as moving without her, while Sperry's

patient complained of tingling on occasion when it moved, in
the months following surgery.

Integrated behavior is thus

condition of conscious-

a

ness which appears to preclude the possibility of multiple

consciousness in any introspectible

,

or self-conscious sense;

parallel intelligent behavior, however, is not limited to

split-brain patients.
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INTEGRATED BEHAVIOR AND INTROSPECTION

Researchers describing the results of split-brain experiments tend to offer alternative grounds for ascribing
single or multiple consciousness to each of their subjects;
on the one hand,

they cite the ability to act in

a

function-

ally integrated manner, and on the other, they rely on the
*

ability to demonstrate awareness through testimony.

The

experimental data cited by researchers in support of the contention that split-brain patients exemplify integrated behavior is used to claim that the behavior is more than simply

intelligent.

But no clear case is made for the contention

that this behavior does demonstrate that split-brain patients
do have parallel, introspectible consciousness which cannot
be assimilated to a parallel model.

The two models of con-

sciousness are confused in descriptions offered of the mental
states of split-brain patients.

The claim that split-brain

patients are multiply conscious appears to be either relatively
trivial and true, or interesting and false.

Norman Geschwind writes in Disconnexion Syndromes in

Animals and Man

(p.

635):

If the ability to give a verbal account is a prerequisite of consciousness, then only the left hemisphere was conscious; if the ability to respond in a
highly organized manner, and use the results of past
experiences constitutes consciousness, then he has

multiple consciousness.
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Sperry states in "Brain Bisection and the Mechanisms of Consciousness"

(p.

303 of Brain and Conscious Experience ):

Everything that we have seen so far indicates that
the surgery left these people with two separate minds,
that is, two separate spheres of consciousness. What
is experienced in the right hemisphere seems to be
entirely outside the realm of awareness of the left
hemisphere. This mental division has been established
with regard to perception, cognition, volition, learning, and memory .
.

.

Sperry is here referring to the responses of subjects in ex-

perimental situations; later, he adds, "The presence of conscious apprehension in

a

hemisphere is hardly demonstrable in

the absence of some mode of expression.
are excluded,

If speech and writing

as they are in the minor hemisphere or in other

kinds of brain damage, more devious testing procedures are
required."

Finally, when pressed in discussion as to whether

the experimental results justify the attribution of multiple

consciousness in split-brain patients, Sperry states, "I can
only go back to the statement that someone made here yester-

day

— namely,

that we tend to infer consciousness by analogy;

in people, we accept it,

and in objects, we don't"

(p.

311).

Thomas Nagel addresses himself to the question of

multiple consciousness.

In "Brain-Bisection and the Unity of

Consciousness," he writes:
There may be other grounds for the ascription of conscious mental states that are sufficient even without
verbalization. And in fact, what the right hemisphere
can do on its own is too elaborate, too intentionally
directed, and too psychologically intelligible to be
regarded merely as a collection of unconscious automatic responses ... it is able to respond to complex
visual and auditory stimuli, including language, and
and
it can control the performance of discriminatory
manipulative tasks.

.
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Nagel concludes here

"...

the right hemisphere displays

enough awareness of what it is doing to justify the attribution of conscious control in the absence of verbal testimony."

Nagel does not conclude that the subjects do have multiple
consciousness, because Nagel offers other grounds for the

attribution of consciousness.

Later, Nagel offers an account

of the unity of consciousness.

Nagel's account of the unity of consciousness differs
from the account offered in the description of the parallel-

process model of consciousness.

The unity of consciousness

on that account concerned the integration of the parallel

processes through the resolution of redundancy of potential
command; the unity is unity of goals.

Nagel's account offers

"some assumptions about the unity of consciousness that are

basic to our understanding of another individual as

a person."

He writes:
We assume that a single mind has sufficiently immediate access to its conscious states so that, for
elements of experience or other mental events occurring
simultaneously or in close temporal proximity, the
mind which is their subject can also experience the
simpler relations among them if it attends to the matter. . . . The experiences of a single person are
thought to take place in an experientially connected
domain, so that relations among experiences can be
substantially captured in the experience of those
relations

Nagel notes that in experimental situations, split-brain
patients flagrantly fail to meet these conditions.

He also

points out that both hemispheres of a split— brain patient
mind are remarkably well-integrated.

There are two major

s
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ambiguities in Nagel

s

account

]

one is "elements of experi—

ence or other mental events," while the other concerns what
it is to have "sufficiently immediate access."

The unity of the members of a series of experiences

which makes them the experience of

a

single objective world,

is a necessary condition of consciousness;

these experiences

are thought to be accessible to a single subject.

Split-

brain patients' hemispheres share certain more or less crude

sensory inputs in normal situations, which they are prevented
from sharing in experimental situations.

So depending upon

how "elements of experience or other mental events" is to be
interpreted, it can refer either to crude, sensory input,
or to an introspectible awareness of the presence of an object.

An equivocation in the description of mental events

results in the immediate possibility of an equivocation of
the subject(s) of that experience, with the equivocation only

becoming apparent in shifts from normal to experimental situations .

There is

a

second, related difficulty with this loose

description of mental events.

If we want to postulate that

split-brain patients are each multiply conscious, we have
to deny that each patient experiences a single,

objective

world; otherwise, the suggestion of multiple consciousness
is without interest.

It would appear then that either each

split— brain patient is not capable of consciousness at all,

which is not the result that we intended, or that each patient
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somehow has more than one set of experiences; these sets
of
experiences make up more than one world.
implies two alternatives.

This latter result

Either the two sets of experiences

(elements of experience or other mental events) are systemati-

cally integrated in some way, prior to the patient's subjective,

introspec tib le experience, so that his subjective

experience is unified; or

a

split— brain patient represents

two subjects, with separate spheres of consciousness.

The plausibility of this first interpretation relies

upon some means of resolving the suggestion that sets of

conscious experiences might not be recognized as distinct
sets.

Presumably, subjects can integrate stimuli from dif-

ferent sense-modalities; they experience the stimuli, but
do not experience their integration.

"Experience" is being

used here in two senses, one of which is presumably intro-

spectible and one of which is not.

Given this equivocation,

split-brain patients can each be said to have unified consciousness.

This condition for the unity of consciousness

then appears to be markedly similar to the parallel-process

model of the unity of consciousness.
This reading probably amounts to
of Nagel's account,

a

willful misreading

for Nagel does specify "a single mind has

sufficiently immediate access to its conscious states" (emphasis mine).

Nagel, however, does not seem to have

a

clear con-

ception of conscious states, and his remarks leave open the

possibility that conscious states do not imply that the subject

:
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whose states those are, has consciousness of them.

Nagel

writes
do not wish to claim that the line between conscious
and unconscious mental activity is a sharp one.
It
is even possible that the distinction is partly relative, in the sense that a given item of mental activity
may be assignable to consciousness or not, depending on
what other mental activities of the same person are
going on at the same time, and whether it is connected
with them in a suitable way.
(p. 404
I

)

Nagel elsewhere mentions the possibility that "everyone has
two minds, but that we don't notice it except in these odd

cases because most pairs of minds in a single body run in

perfect parallel due to the direct communication between the
hemispheres which provides their anatomical bases"

(p.

409

).

Obviously, the crux of the problem here lies in determining
why we should be able to introspect conscious states, if our

ability to introspect them varies according to what other

mental activities are occurring concurrently.

The truly in-

teresting problem concerns the relation of conscious states
to consciousness.

Unfortunately, on Nagel's account, this relation
appears to be closely tied to the problem of direct access,
or "sufficiently immediate access," and this is extremely

deceptive.

Nagel compares direct access with integrated be-

havior, and this comparison can only lead to confusion.

The

apparent integration of the overt behavior of split-brain
patients accustoms researchers to describe patients as single
subjects in ordinary situations, and as two subjects in ex-

perimental situations.

But without some comprehensive account

.
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of the relation between the unity of consciousness
and inte-

grated behavior, the inclusion of

a

criterion involving

direct access in descriptions of overt behavior is meaningless.

Describing such access as

11

sufficiently immediate"

only compounds the problem, for this description leaves open
to question whether such access incompasses or excludes

strategies
If by "sufficiently immediate access," Nagel means to

require introspection, excluding strategies, then splitbrain patients are each invariably two subjects.

Neither

hemisphere can introspect the other's mental states at all;
the failure to introspect is demonstrated by the confabula-

tory responses offered by the "verbal" hemisphere in explanation of the activities of the other hemisphere.

Conf abulatory

responses are defined as the "chatty filling-in" of gaps in
experience.

If introspection is required,

do not comprise

a

single mind.

the two hemispheres

However, if Nagel means to

permit the kind of strategies accessible to both hemispheres
to constitute sufficiently immediate access,

accepting the

transfer of information across the body, then the patient

may meet Nagel's condition for possessing
The patient meets this condition in
ner,

a

a

single mind.

rather unorthodox man-

as we are unaccustomed to voluntary physical actions as

comprising

a

form of mental access.

It is of great importance

that one standard for the immediacy of access be applied to

subjects in both experimental and normal situations; the

:

34

unorthodoxy of voluntary physical actions as comprising
mental access makes it difficult to remember to apply

a

uni-

form standard.

Nagel has difficulties in applying one standard con-

sistently to split-brain patients in both experimental and
normal situations; he appears to vacillate between the two

standards of immediacy.

Nagel states "functions of the right

hemisphere are inaccessible not only to speech but to any

direct combination with corresponding functions of the left
hemisphere"

(p.

emphasis mine).

405,

But Nagel suggests

later

There is little doubt that information from the two
sides of their brains can be pooled to yield integrated behavioral control. And although this is not
accomplished by the usual methods, it is not clear
that this settles the question against assigning the
integrative functions to a single mind. . .
Nevertheless, if we assign the integrative functions to a
single mind, we must also ascribe the experimentally
evoked disassociation to that mind, and this is not
.

easy.

(p.

40G)

Although Nagel appears here to be accepting behavioral integration as affording sufficiently immediate access, he argues
against this view by abandoning this view and endorsing some
other form of access.

In arguing against this view, Nagel

explains why it is not easy to ascribe the experimentally

evoked disassociation to that mind; he writes, "there is

nothing about the experimental situation that might be ex-

pected to produce
In fact,

mine).

a

fundamental internal change in the patient.

it produces no anatomical changes"

(p.

408,

emphasis

This rejoinder can only be interpreted as evidence of
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gross confusion of conditions of access, which
results in
a confusion of mind and brain.
If strategies are accepted
a

as constituting a form of mental access,

then the prevention

of strategies cannot be described as a purely
physical change*

their prevention constitutes

a

change in the mind.

This

change requires neither internal nor anatomical changes.
If what is significant in the mind,

ormation

,

is the transfer of

and no assumptions are made concerning the means

used to transmit that information, then the explanation for
the loss of interhemispheric integration in experimental

situations is obvious.

The changes produced in the experi-

mental situation can be attributed to the blockage or saturation of the bodily channels used in information transfer by

strategies.

The cases demonstrating a loss of the ability

to respond in an integrated way, when strategies are disrupted,
is similar to the failure to respond normally shown by persons

whose central nervous systems cannot assimilate all the information they are given, or are not given enough information.
For example, stuttering and language difficulties result as
a

consequence of forcing

a

person to switch "handedness,"

because both hemispheres give each other needless and duplicated information; failure results because there is too much

information to be assimilated.

Too little information, such

as results from other forms of disconnexion syndrome (e.g.,

loss of a visual association area) results in conf abulatory

responses similar to those manifested by split-brain patients
in experimental situations in which strategies are prevented.
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Once the confusion engendered by

a

change in the condi-

tions for access to mental states is resolved, there is con-

sistently either one subject or two; we are no longer troubled
by minds "popping in and out of existence," and the unity of

consciousness is not

a

somehow transient phenomenon.

But if

it appears that whether strategies can be permitted to consti-

tute access or not remains

a

decision question, this illusion

is only a consequence of our ignorance of the way strategies

function.

The fundamental issue lies in assessing what

strategies do, to permit behavioral integration, aid why split-

brain patients do not experience the use of strategies in
their subjective experience; after all, strategies are based

upon voluntary action.

Yet it appears to be voluntary action

which is not introspectible.

voluntary action

_is

It is the presumption that

conscious action which gives this state-

ment its suggestion of paradox; we then appear to have conscious states which are not accessible to consciousness.

The suggestion that voluntary actions are conscious leads to
the view of strategies as observable by the split-brain subjects, and the view that strategies are somehow observable

leads to the idea that strategies constitute inferences as
to the mental states of the opposite hemisphere.

This view

lends the two-minds position much of its attractiveness

;

it

which
offers the juxtaposition of direct access and inference
mental
forms one of our criteria for the individuation of
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subjects.

In my next section,

fundamentally mistaken.

I

I

argue that this view is

demonstrate, using Nagel's five

alternative descriptions of split-brain patients, some of
the profound conceptual problems which this view faces.
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CONCLUSION:

CONSCIOUS STATES AND CONSC IOUSNESS

The most fundamental issue in interpreting
split-brain

experiments as demonstrating the possibility of multiple
consciousness,

lies in the relation between conscious states

and the consciousness of those states.

This relation is very

difficult to describe, partly because of the necessity to
rule out whatever conscious states originate in the midbrain,

but also because the human mind can discriminate "mental
events" at different levels of simplicity.

We find the ina-

bility to introspect certain features of our experience
baffling.

If we can see something at various levels of sim-

plicity or complexity, depending upon how much detail we wish
to discriminate,

then we feel that we ought to be able to

recognize and introspect features of our conscious experience
of seeing that thing.

Strategies used in split-brain experi-

ments are puzzling, because it seems that the subject must

either perform consciously and be aware of his use of strategies, or must behave automatically.

In the first case,

split-

i
|
brain patients have multiple introspectible consciousness;
in the second,

they each have single minds.

The interpreta-

tion which is offered, and the one which is perhaps best, is

one which can describe both hemispheres as capable of intelligent, purposive action and then offer an account of our ex-

perience of that action.
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Nagel offers five different descriptions
of the minds
of split-brain patients.
They are the following:
1

.

2.

h
P tie
ne fairly normal ™ind associated
^^
with^the fL
left r
hemisphere, and the responses emanat?>

e .°

ing irom the nonverbal right hemisphere
are the
responses of an automaton, and are not
produced
by conscious mental processes.
3.

4.

The patients have only one mind, associated
with
the left hemisphere, but there also occur
(associated with the right hemisphere) isolated
conscious mental phenomena, not integrated into a
mind at all, though they can perhaps be ascribed
to the organism.

The patients have two minds, one of which can talk
and one of which can't.

They have one mind, whose contents derive from
botn hemispheres and are rather peculiar and
dissociated.
b.

They have one normal mind most of the time, while
the hemispheres are functioning in parallel, but
two minds are elicited by the experimental situations which yield the interesting results (perhaps
the single mind splits in two and reconvenes after
the experiment is over).

Nagel's argument in rejecting these five alternatives relies
on the assumption that either the responses of the right

hemisphere are unconscious and automatic, or they are conscious.
Denying that the responses are unconscious and automatic,
Nagel is forced to affirm that they are conscious; he cannot

give an account of conscious experience which approximates
that of normal persons.

Nagel postulates that these conscious

thoughts are isolated, or "peculiar and disassociated."

Nagel does not appear to have an answer to the question:
can these contents be experienced at all

,

if they are not

But

how
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integrated into the rest of experience?

If these experi-

ences are isolated, disassociated
or peculiar, the answer
appears to oe, tnat tney are not
experienced; someone else,
or something else experiences these
aspects of experience.
Nagel suggests that either the right
hemisphere is conscious, or it is merely "a collection
of unconscious automatic
responses."
Nagel then argues against the possibility
that
the activities ascribed to the right
hemisphere could be

unconscious automatic responses.

Nagel describes these

activities as "too elaborate, too intentionally
directed,
and too psychologically intelligible" to be
unconscious.

The fact that these responses are elaborate and
intentionally

directed does not make them necessarily conscious.
Sayre has pointed out in Consciousness:
o_f_

Minds and Machines

conscious.

,

Kenneth

A Philosophic Study

that purposeful activity need not be

Sayre points out that certain animals manifest

elaborate and intentionally directed forms of behavior, and
yet we ascribe the behavior to instinct, and question whether
the animals are conscious.

The difficulty in interpreting

the responses of the right hemisphere as collections of un-

conscious automatic responses lies in accepting them as automatic.

Nagel's use of the term "automaton" rather prejudges

the issue; if these responses are described as evincing common
and familiar actions, to which we are so habituated that we
are capable of performing them without consciously attending
to our performances,

attractive.

then this alternative is much more
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Moreover, nothing Nagel offers as an activity
performable by the right hemisphere exceeds this ability.

The right

hemisphere responds to complex visual and auditory stimuli.
Nagel states that the right hemisphere also responded to
language, but the patients'

language ability in this hemi-

sphere was interestingly limited.
nouns, but not to verbs.

Patients responded to

Oddly, the patients responded cor-

rectly to nouns such as "butter," "letter," etc., but not
to similar nouns derived from verbs,

"locker," etc.

such as "fighter,"

Gazzaniga states in The Bisected Drain

(p.

119)

"there was no evidence that verbs were understood or compre-

hended at all."

If the possibility is allowed that the right

hemisphere functions intelligently in integrating these
stimuli, and in performing certain actions, then there is
less resistance to the concept of "unconscious responses."

The difficulty with this view is that it is hard to

reconcile purposeful attentive action with the requirement
that the subject cannot be conscious of those actions.

If

the behavior is intelligent, then it seems that it must be at

least potentially conscious; if the actions performed (appar-

ently by the right hemisphere) are merely actions to which we
are, perhaps, habituated,

then they are in some sense volun-

tary and ought to be such that we are at least capable of

introspecting them, or being self-conscious of them.
Nagel's second possibility allows that the right hemisphere's activities are conscious, without belonging to

a

mind
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at all.

There are difficulties with this view; chiefly, the

possibility that there are conscious states that do not belong to a mind seems unintelligible.
a

Nagel wants to refute

view similar to that just presented in rebuttal of his

first proposal; he wants to argue against the view that the

activities of the right hemisphere merely represent slices
of purposeful behavior.

The issue in question is whether a

system capable of "carrying out tasks which require the inte-

gration of diverse psychological determinants" must consciously

integrate those determinants, or at least, must be

capable of consciously integrating those determinants.
Nagel appears

to

presuppose this conscious integration in

arguing that the right hemisphere's activities belong to

a

subject of experience and action.
Perhaps the most obvious point is one made in Section

3

it is at best problematic to assert that the right hemisphere

independently carries out such tasks.

It is questionable

whether any integration of "psychological determinants" is
performed by the right hemisphere alone.

VJhat

may perhaps

be conceded is that the right hemisphere independently ex-

periences consciousness' "simplest elements, the raw sensations like the color red, for example, the colors, sounds,
taste,

touch,

and smell"

(Sperry,

Mechanisms of Consciousness,"

p.

"Brain Bisection and the
313);

the ability to experi-

without
ence such sensations can surely proceed in parallel,

disturbing anyone's concept of consciousness.
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And so, we are left with Nagel's fifth
alternative.
The hemispheres function in parallel.

An explanation can

be given for the apparent appearance of two minds
in experimental situations; it has been presented in Section
4.

Strategies constitute

disruption causes

a

form of mental access, and their

a loss of

integrated activity at least

with regard to the activity being tested; aspects of behavior unaffected by the experiment continue undisturbed.

The

fundamental problem with this account is that although it
offers

a

solution,

the connection between integrated behav-

ior and our experience of it, depends upon structuring a

situation into

a

context in the light of our goals.

Although it is relatively easy to demonstrate the
difficulty of establishing that the hemispheres of

a

split-

brain patient's brain could have divergent goals, this demonstration does not suffice to show that the hemispheres could
not have divergent goals.

The primary weakness of the

description given, in which split-brain patients do not subjectively experience disunity, lies in the possibility that

split-brain subjects are two different subjects, or do di-

verge to become two different subjects during experimental
situations.

If split-brain patients each had two sets of

goals, generally uniform but occasionally distinct, then

perhaps they would each be two subjects, or would diverge
to become two subjects when attempting to work toward those

goals.

The difficulty in refuting this possibility is that
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no appeal can be made to the
patients'

su b] ective experience.

But the possibility that the
patients are each two subjects is not an attractive view
to defend, nonetheless.
On this view, it is difficult
to explain the ability of the

hemispheres to function together.
gies

In order to perform strate-

m

situations in which the hemispheres'
access to the
perceptual input available to the opposite
hemisphere is
deliberately restricted by the experimenter,
the hemispheres
can devise fairly sophisticated strategies.
On
the two-

minds view,

the ability to perform strategies of this
kind

is problematic.

It is difficult to grasp how the two hemi-

spheres could structure

a

situation independently so that

the lack of information from one hemisphere to the other

could be informative.

The problem with an interesting defense

of the two-minds view,

lies in explaining the significance

of negative information in response latencies.

Given the

view that there are two minds, which somehow observe each
other,

and make inferences (which at least in principle are

introspectible

)

,

from the actions of the opposite "side,"

accounting for the ability to make inferences when the other
side did literally nothing is difficult.

A somewhat burlesqued example can be given of this
point.

In one of Arthur Conan Doyle's stories ("The Case of

Silver Blaze"

)

,

there is

a

famous exchange in which Sherlock

Holmes refers to "the curious incident of the dog in the
night."

When someone states "the dog did nothing in the
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night;,"

Holmes replies "that was the
curious incident."
Taken literally, this exchange
suggests an interpretation
worthy of Fridugis "nothing"
obviously names something, or
refers to something, in this case a
very significant action
by the watch-dog in the case. But
that the dog did not do
something (namely, bark at an intruder)
is significant only
in the context of certain expectations.
;

The same point can be made of split-brain
patients;
in those experiments upon which the
two-mind view depends,

there must be

a

context of shared expectation in order for

the feedback strategies to work.

Either the experimental

subjects' hemispheres independently perceive the same
aspects
of the situation as significant because they share

the same

purposes, or because the experimental situation is itself so

structured that each hemisphere perceives what is required
of it.

The first alternative suggests

pose which suggests

a

a

unanimity of pur-

pre-established harmony, if the ability

to perceive the situation as significant really depends on

the subjects.

The second alternative depends on the ability

of the sides to respond to a situation,

in which their tasks

somehow can be grasped and performed solely in the context
provided by the experiment.

Because the situations cannot

be so perceived by the hemispheres independently, and because

they frequently rely upon the ability to contrast or compare

isolated objects, this explanation is inadequate.

But if in

this latter situation, the subjects are postulated to share
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an understanding of the purpose of the experiment, then
the

situation is simply that described in terms of the resolution of redundancy of potential command.

There is no need

to postulate that split-brain patients each have two minds.

The suggestion that split-brain patients have two

minds requires the individuation of perceptions (including

somesthetic sensations), purposes, etc. into two distinct
sets,

as well as an explanation of the fact that these sets

must overlap and share identical members.

It requires an

explanation of the internal coherence of one of these sets,
and either an account of the internal coherence of the other
or an explication of its somewhat anomalous status vis-a-vis

the other.

Although the account of the relation of "the

naive attitude" and the possibility of reflective awareness
offered by the parallel-process explication of consciousness
could use improvement, the account offered in the two-minds

view shares those difficulties and adds others of its own.

y

,

:
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